Theory of Knowledge
Fall 2006
Introductory Lecture

I. Introduction

A. What is the theory of knowledge?

Theory of knowledge = epistemology = philosophical questions about knowledge and rationality.

It will take some work to get clear about what the philosophical questions are. First, an example to illustrate what they aren’t. In the 1970s during the Watergate hearings concerning president Nixon, Sen. Howard Baker became famous for asking, “What did the President know and when did he know it?” This formulation has become common in investigations. These are questions about knowledge. Interesting and important questions. But not epistemology. Epistemology asks more general questions about standards, concepts, and methodology. Many examples are discussed, but just as ways to illustrate and discuss the general ideas. So, what are the general questions?

B. How Epistemological Questions Arise

1. Clarifying our common sense view. We claim to know a variety of things. Reflection on these claims raises several questions. What exactly is the difference between a case in which we do have knowledge and a case in which we don’t? As we’ll see, that question, and the ones it leads to, are remarkably hard and interesting.

2. Challenges to common sense.

a. Skepticism. There are challenging arguments that conclude that we don’t know anything at all.

b. Science and Epistemology. What implications, if any, does science have for our common sense view?

c. Relativism. Reflection on the fact that people differ so widely in what they claim to know and what they think is reasonable calls into question our ordinary view.

We’ll see how each point generates a set of related philosophical questions.

II. The Standard View of Knowledge and Rationality

We typically think we know a fair amount. If we do, then we have some ways of acquiring this knowledge, or sources of knowledge. Reflection on these ideas yields some questions. We’ll briefly identify some of the things we think we know and some sources of knowledge, then look at some of the questions provoked.

A. Knowledge Claims

We claim to know lots of things. See text, pp. 2-3. We will look at this list more carefully next time. Questions to consider: what do you think of this list? should anything be deleted? anything added? (Write down your answers and bring them in. Not to be collected.)

B. Sources of Knowledge

Each of these must have a source - there is some way we know. See text p. 2. (Same questions.)

III. Some Questions Provoked by (A) and (B) (Course Outline)

There is a whole set of questions that arises once we reflect on these claims. These questions, or some of them, constitute the primary subject matter of epistemology. And there are questions about how to go about answering the primary ones - meta-questions - that are part of epistemology as well.

A. Implications of the Common Sense View

Let's take it for granted for the moment that we are right - we do know the various things we say we know. What is it that these things share? What does it take to know something? What are the conditions for knowledge? We will attempt to answer this, focusing on what is usually regarded as the traditional answer. This leads to (Q1) - (Q3) from the text. This will take the first half of the course. While thinking about this, we will assume that we do know pretty much what we think we know.

B. Challenges to The Standard View

We will then turn to a variety of ideas that challenge The Standard View. I’ve divided them up into three categories. These categories overlap.

First: Skeptical (philosophical) challenges. See (Q4).

Second: Scientific challenges. Some of this has to do with methodology. Some people have the idea that science will eventually answer all our questions or that there is something illegitimate about the sort of armchair reflection we do. There are also philosophical challenges to scientific reasoning, especially inductive reasoning. And there is evidence that we often reason very badly. All of these lead to challenges to the Standard View. See (Q5).

Third: the challenge of relativism. In spelling out the Standard View we apparently assume that there are right answers to questions and that there are proper standards of reasoning. We assume some kind of “absolutism”. But if you look around the world, there is enormous variation. What are we to make of this? See (Q6). In connection with this, we will also think about the rationality of belief when you know that people just as smart as you believe differently.