Re-Revised Schedule

III. Justification

   E. The Causal Theory (H: 450-463; F: Ch. 5, Sec. I)                            Nov. 8

   F. Truth Tracking (H: 475-490; F: Ch. 5, Sec. II)                                 Nov. 10

   G. Reliabilism (F: Ch. 5, Sec. III)                                                         Nov. 13

   H. Proper Function Theory ( F: Ch. 5, Sec. IV)                                    Nov. 13

IV. Skeptical Challenges to The Standard View

   A. What is Skepticism (F: Ch. 6, Sec. I-II)                                            Nov. 15 20

   B. Four Arguments for Skepticism (H: 513-523 ; F: Ch. 6, Sec. III)    Nov. 17

   C. Replies to the Arguments for Skepticism (H: 575-581, 602-610; F: Ch. 6, Sec. IV-V)                                                                                                                         Nov. 20 Nov. 27-29

   D. The Problem of Induction (H: 293-320, 333-343; F: Ch. 7, Sec. I) Nov. 27-29 Dec. 1-4

   E. A New Argument for Skepticism (H: 64-73; F: Ch. 7, Sec. II )        Dec. 1-4 Dec. 6

   F. Contextualism (H: 491-505; F: Ch. 7, Appendix)                             Dec. 6

V. Epistemology, Science, and The Standard View                                Dec. 8-11

   A. Empirical Evidence for Irrationality (H: 275-291; F: Ch. 8, Sec. I)             

   B. Naturalism: Is Epistemology Possible? (F: Ch. 8, Sec. II) 

VI. Epistemological Relativism (F: Ch. 9)                                                Dec. 13