I. Instructor
Richard Feldman                                                        
Offices: Lattimore 518, Lattimore 317
Office Hours: Wed. 2-3, and by appointment
Phone: x58106
E-Mail: richard.feldman@rochester.edu

 

TA

Andrea Patterson

Office: Lattimore 534

Office Hours: M 10-11, F 11-12

Phone: x54387

E-Mail: ajpgla@rit.edu

 

II. Texts
Epistemology: Contemporary Readings, edited by Michael Huemer
Epistemology, by Richard Feldman
Other readings will be made available online or on reserve.

 

III. Web Page

Course information, including this syllabus, assignments, some lecture notes, and schedule changes, will be available online at http://www.ling.rochester.edu/~feldman/philosophy243/index.html.

 

IV. Requirements
1. An in-class mid-term exam. (20% of course grade.)
2. A take-home final exam. (20%.) (There will be an option to write a final paper on an approved topic.)
3. Approximately 8 1-2 page written assignments. Each assignment will require a precise reformulation of some claim or argument from the readings or a presentation of an objection to some point made in the readings or in class. Approximately 10 of these assignments will be made and the best 8 grades will be counted. (It is possible that the exact number of assignments made and required will be changed slightly.) (50%)
4. Regular participation in class discussions. Questions will often be given in out in class for discussion in the next class. Participation in discussion will proceed best when these questions have been considered prior to class. (10%)

 

(Tentative) Course Outline and Reading List

Readings are listed following the topics. Readings from the Epistemology anthology are indicated by 'H’ followed by pages numbers. Readings from the Epistemology text are indicated by an 'F' followed by chapter and section numbers.

I.         Introduction: The Standard View About Knowledge and Rationality (F: Ch. 1)

II.        Knowledge

            A.        The Traditional Analysis (H: 440-3; F: Ch. 2)

            B.        An Objection to the Traditional Analysis(H: 444-6 ; F: Ch. 3, Sec. I)

            C.        Defending and Modifying the Traditional Analysis (H: 447-9, 464-474; F: Ch. 3, Sec. II-IV)

III.       Justification

            A.        Evidentialism (F: Ch. 4, Sec. I; W.K. Clifford, "The Ethics of Belief" "The Will to Believe" available online.)

            B.        Cartesian Foundationalism (F: Ch. 4, Sec. II-III)

            C.        Coherentism (H: 387-401; F: Ch. 4, Sec. IV)

            D.        Modest Foundationalism (H: 402-416; F: Sec. V)

            E.        The Causal Theory (H: 450-463; F: Ch. 5, Sec. I)

            F.        Truth Tracking (H: 475-490; F: Ch. 5, Sec. II)

            G.        Reliabilism (F: Ch. 5, Sec. III)

            H.        Proper Function Theory ( F: Ch. 5, Sec. IV)

IV.      Skeptical Challenges to The Standard View

            A.        What is Skepticism (F: Ch. 6, Sec. I-II)

            B.        Four Arguments for Skepticism (H: 513-523 ; F: Ch. 6, Sec. III)

            C.        Replies to the Arguments for Skepticism (H: 575-581, 602-610; F: Ch. 6, Sec. IV-V)

            D.        The Problem of Induction (H: 293-320, 333-343; F: Ch. 7, Sec. I)

            E.        A New Argument for Skepticism (H: 64-73; F: Ch. 7, Sec. II )

            F.        Contextualism (H: 491-505; F: Ch. 7, Appendix)

V.        Epistemology, Science, and The Standard View

            A.        Empirical Evidence for Irrationality (H: 275-291; F: Ch. 8, Sec. I)

            B.        Naturalism: Is Epistemology Possible? (F: Ch. 8, Sec. II)

VI.      Epistemological Relativism (F: Ch. 9)