Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness

Philosophy 515: Selected Topics in Philosophy of Mind

Fall 2000

Instructor: David Braun

Time & Place: W 2 - 4:40, Lattimore 531

Office, Phone, Office Hours: Lattimore 525, 275-8107, M 2-4.

E-mail: dbrn@troi.cc.rochester.edu

Topic

Frank Jackson and David Chalmers have argued that qualia (the properties of our experiences that we are consciously aware of) are non-physical. They present two main arguments for their conclusion. The first is the knowledge argument, which claims that a person who knew all of the physical facts about sensations of red, but had not had a sensation of red, would not know what it is like to see red. The second is a modal argument, which claims that it is possible for an entity that is physically like us to lack conscious experience. In this seminar, we will critically examine these arguments, and others, against materialist theories of qualia and consciousness. Among the topics that we will discuss are: propositional attitudes (such as believing, knowing, and conceiving), conceivability as a guide to possibility, the necessity of identity, supervenience, possible world semantics, two-dimensional possible-world semantics, propositions and ways of grasping them, necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori propositions.

Prerequisites

The readings in this course often presuppose an enormous background in philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. Thus students taking this course will find it helpful to have taken courses equivalent to our Philosophy 244/444 (Philosophy of Mind) and Philosophy 247/447 (Philosophy of Language). I will assume that everyone in the class is familiar with the identity theory and functionalism in philosophy of mind. (See the beginning of the reading list for some references.) I will try to present the other relevant background in philosophy of mind and philosophy of language in class. Undergraduates must have my written permission to enroll in the course.

Texts

The following three books are available for purchase in the bookstore and are on reserve in Rush Rhees Library.

Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity.

David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind.

Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics.

The following book is on reserve at Rush Rhees.

Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, and Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates.

A manuscript of the following book is available in the Beck Philosophy Library.

John Perry, Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness.

Requirements

1. Weekly comment papers, about 1-2 pages.

2. A class presentation.

3. A longer paper, about 12 pages, due Friday, December 15.

Weekly Comment Papers

You will write a 1-2 page "comment paper" every week except for those weeks (near the end of the semester) when we have student presentations. Each of these will comment on the readings for that week. Your comment paper for a given week must be in my mailbox by 9:00 am Wednesday of that week. I may discuss your comment during the following seminar meeting.

Class Presentations

Your presentation will be an opportunity for you to get comments on a draft of your long paper. You will make a rough draft of your long paper available in the Beck Library by noon of the Monday preceding the day of your presentation. Your presentation, and the discussion of your paper, should take about half of a seminar session (about 1 1/2 hours). The number of seminar sessions that we dedicate to presentations will depend on the number of students enrolled. I expect us to use at least the seminar meetings on December 6 and 13 for presentations.

Long Paper

The most straightforward sort of paper to write is a critique of some paper about consciousness. The literature is huge and the books we are reading are full of references to appropriate articles. Your "target" may (of course) be an article or book that we discuss in class.

Grading

Comment papers: 15% Presentation: 15% Long paper: 70%

Reading List and Schedule

Tentative: Subject to Revision

Those who are unfamiliar with the identity theory and functionalism in philosophy of mind should read the following:

Jaegon Kim, Philosophy of Mind, appropriate chapters.

Ned Block, Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, introduction to the section on functionalism.

Appropriate articles from Blackwell's Companion to Philosophy of Mind.

Several articles we will read are contained in Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, and Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. I refer to it below as 'BFG'.

1. September 6 Introduction to topic. Possible world semantics. The naive theory of meaning.

Recommended

Nathan Salmon, Frege's Puzzle, chapter 1.

2. September 13 Frege's theory of sense and reference. Descriptivism. Kripke's criticisms of descriptivism. Necessary a posteriori "statements".

Frege, "On sense and reference", first two pages.

Kripke, Naming and Necessity, lectures 1 and 2.

Recommended

Salmon, Frege's Puzzle, Appendix B.

3. September 20 Indexicals, descriptivism, and ways of taking propositions. The naive theory again.

John Perry, "Frege on Demonstratives", Philosophical Review 1977.

John Perry, "The Problem of the Essential Indexical", Nous 1979.

Recommended

Salmon, Frege's Puzzle, chapter 8.

4. September 27 Kripke on the necessity of identity and the necessary a posteriori. Kripke's argument against the identity theory.

Kripke, Naming and Necessity, chapter 3.

Richard Boyd, "Materialism without Reductionism", in Block (ed.) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology.

Christopher Hill, "Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem", Phil. Studies 87, 1997.

5. October 4 Supervenience and minimal materialism. Qualia and consciousness. Jackson's Knowledge Argument.

Chalmers, Conscious Mind, chapter 1 and chapter 2, pp. 32-51.

Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy of Mind, chapters 1 and 9.

John Perry, Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness, chapter 1-3.

Frank Jackson, "Epiphenomenal Qualia", Phil. Quarterly 1982.

Frank Jackson, "What Mary Didn't Know," J. of Phil. 1986. Also in BFG.

David Lewis, "What Experience Teaches," in BFG.

Earl Conee, "Phenomenal Knowledge," Australasian J. Phil., 1994.

6. October 11 Jackson's Knowledge Argument, Continued.

William Lycan, "A Limited Defense of Phenomenal Information," in Thomas Metzinger (ed.),Conscious Experience.

Brian Loar, "Phenomenal States", in BFG.

Recommended

John Perry, Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness, chapter X.

7. October 18 Levine on conceptual analysis and the explanatory gap. Jackson on conceptual analysis and materialism. The necessary a posteriori and two-dimensional possible-worlds semantics.

Joseph Levine, "On Leaving Out What It's Like," in BFG.

Jackson, "Finding the Mind in the Natural World," in BFG.

Jackson, "Postscript to 'What Mary Didn't Know'", Moser & Trout (eds.) 1995, Contemporary Materialism.

Recommended

Robert Stalnaker, "Introduction" and "Assertion" in his Context and Content.

8. October 25 Jackson on the necessary a posteriori, continued. The naive theory, a priority, and a posteriority.

Alex Byrne, "Cosmic Hermeneutics", Phil Perspectives.

Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker, "Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap", Phil. Review, 1998.

Recommended

Joseph Levine, xxxxxx, Nous.

9. November 1 Chalmers on zombies

Chalmers, Conscious Mind, pp. 52-171.

John Perry, Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness, chapter 4.

Alex Byrne, "Cosmic Hermeneutics", Philosophical Perspectives 1999.

Alex Byrne, "Chalmers' Two-Dimensional Argument Against Physicalism" on Byrne's web-page (www.mit.edu/???)

10. November 8 Chalmers, continued.

Stephen Yablo, "Textbook Kripkeanism", Pacific Phil. Quarterly 81 (2000), pp. 98-112.

James Pryor, "What Can We Know A Priori About Water?" at his website (Harvard)

11. November 15 Modal rationalism

Exchange in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research between Shoemaker, Hill & McLaughlin, Yablo, and Chalmers.

12. November 29 Catch up, review

13. December 6 Student presentations

14. December 13 Student presentations