Names, Descriptions, Belief Ascriptions, and Meanings
Philosophy 516: Selected Topics in Philosophy of Language
Fall 2001
Instructor: David Braun
Time & Place: Mondays 2 - 4:40, Lattimore 531
Office, Phone, Office Hours: Lattimore 525, 275-8107, Wednesdays 2-4.
E-mail: dbrn@troi.cc.rochester.edu
Topic
This seminar will be dedicated to reading Saul Kripke's Naming and Necessity and Scott Soames's forthcoming book Beyond Rigidity: the
Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity. Most of Soames's book tries to justify a semantic theory that is a rather natural
development of the views expressed by Kripke in N&N. This theory is commonly called 'Millianism', 'neo-Russellianism', 'the naive theory'
and (the name I slightly prefer) 'Naive Russellianism'. Its most notorious thesis is the claim that the semantic content of a proper name is
simply its referent. After some introduction, we will examine Kripke's arguments against classic descriptivist theories of names, and
Soames's arguments against newer descriptivist theories. We'll read recent descriptivist responses. We'll consider how Kripke's arguments
motivate Naive Russellianism (NR), and the problem that NR has with cognitive significance and belief ascriptions. We'll consider
alternatives to NR, and criticisms of those theories. We'll end with some issues concerning kind terms such as 'dog' and 'red'. For instance,
we will consider whether they are rigid designators, as Kripke claims.
Prerequisites
I will not assume any prior knowledge of philosophy of language. However, my presentations of the basic material at the beginning of the
seminar will be faster than my presentations in undergraduate courses, so it will still be useful to have taken a course that is equivalent to
our Philosophy 247/447 (Philosophy of Language). Undergraduates must have my written permission to enroll in the course.
Texts
There are two required texts: Kripke's Naming and Necessity and Soames's new book manuscript. Copies of the first are on sale at the
bookstore. Soames's manuscript is available for photocopying in the Beck library.
Requirements
1. Weekly comment papers, about 1-2 pages.
2. A class presentation.
3. A longer paper, about 12 pages, due Wednesday, December 12.
Weekly Comment Papers
You will write a 1-2 page "comment paper" every week except for those weeks (near the end of the semester) when we have student
presentations. Each of these will comment on the readings for that week. Your comment paper for a week must be in my mailbox by 9:00
am Monday of that week. I may discuss your comment during the seminar meeting later that day.
Class Presentations
Your presentation will be an opportunity for you to get comments on a draft of your long paper. You will make a rough draft of your long
paper available in the Beck Library by noon of the Friday preceding the day of your presentation. Your presentation, and our discussion of
your presentation, should take about half of a seminar session (about 1 1/2 hours). The number of seminar sessions that we dedicate to
presentations will depend on the number of students enrolled. I expect us to use at least the seminar meetings on December 3 and 10 for presentations.
Long Paper
The most straightforward sort of paper to write is a critique of some published paper on a topic relevant to this course. Your "target" may
be an article or book that we discuss in class.
Grading
Comment papers: 15% Presentation: 15% Long paper: 70%
Reading List and Schedule
Very Tentative and Subject to Revision
1. September 10 The naive theory of meaning (Naive Russellianism). Frege's theory of sense and reference and Russell's descriptivism.
Possible world semantics.
Frege, "On Sense and Reference."
Russell, "Knowledge by Acquaintance and by Description."
Recommended
Nathan Salmon, Frege's Puzzle, chapter 1.
2. September 17 Kripke's criticisms of descriptivism. Some responses.
Kripke, Naming and Necessity, lectures 1 and 2.
Soames, Beyond Rigidity, chapter 1and pp. 1-9 of chapter 2.
Michael Dummett, The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy, chapter 9 and appendix 3.
Alvin Plantinga, "The Boethian Compromise," American Phil. Quarterly (1978), pp. 429-38.
Frederick Kroon, "Causal Descriptivism," Austral. J. of Phil. 65 (1987), pp. 1-17.
Recommended
Nathan Salmon, "Reference and Information Content: Names and Descriptions," in Gabbay and Guenthner (eds) (1989) Handbook of Philosophical Logic Volume IV, pp. 409-461.
Nathan Salmon, Reference and Essence, chapters 1 and 2.
John Searle, Intentionality, pp. 231-261; reprinted in Martinich as "Proper Names and Intentionality."
Kent Bach, "What's In a Name," Austral. J. of Phil. 59 (1981), pp. 371-386.
3. September 24 Soames's criticisms of wide-scope and rigidified description theories.
Michael Dummett, The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy, chapter 9 and appendix 3.
Frederick Kroon, "Causal Descriptivism," Austral. J. of Phil. 65 (1987), pp. 1-17.
Kripke, N&N, preface.
Soames, Beyond Rigidity, chapter 2.
Recommended
Nathan Salmon, Reference and Essence, pp. 32-41 (on types of rigid designators).
Diana (Felicia) Ackerman, "Proper Names, Propositional Attitudes, and Non-Descriptive Connotations," Phil. Studies 35 (1979), pp. 55-69.
Diana (Felicia) Ackerman, "Proper Names, Essences, and Intuitive Beliefs," Theory and Decision11 (1979), pp. 5-26.
4. October 1 More descriptivist responses
Frank Jackson, "Reference and Description Revisited," Phil. Perspectives 12 (1998), pp. 201-218.
David Sosa, "Rigidity in the Scope of Russell's Theory," Nous 35 (2001), pp. 1-38.
Jason Stanley, "Names and Rigid Designation," in Bob Hale and Crispin Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language.
October 8 Fall break, no class
5. October 15 The contents of proper names. The problem of cognitive significance.
Soames, Beyond Rigidity, chapter 3.
Nathan Salmon, Frege's Puzzle, chapters 5 and 6.
Nathan Salmon, "A Millian Heir Rejects the Wages of Sinn," in C. Anthony Anderson and Joseph Owens (eds.), Propositional Attitudes.
David Braun, "Cognitive Significance, Attitude Ascriptions, and Ways of Believing," web page.
6. October 22 Belief ascriptions. Sentential theories and the Interpreted Logical Form theory.
Soames, Beyond Rigidity, chapter 6.
Rudolf Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, secs. 13-15.
Alonzo Church, "On Carnap's analysis of Statements of Assertion and Belief," Analysis 10 (1950), pp. 298-304. Reprinted in Leonard Linsky (ed.), Reference and Modality.
John Bigelow, "Believing in Semantics," Linguistics and Philosophy 2, 1978, 101-44.
Richard Larson and Peter Ludlow, "Interpreted Logical Forms," Synthese 95 (1993), pp. 305-56. Reprinted in Peter Ludlow (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Language.
Soames, Beyond Rigidity, chapter 7, pp. 1-13.
7. October 29 Mark Richard's theory of belief ascriptions. Soames's critique of it.
Mark Richard, "How I Say What You Think," Midwest Studies 1989.
Soames, Beyond Rigidity, chapter 7, pp. 13-27.
Recommended
Soames, Beyond Rigidity, chapter 7, pp. 27-64.
Mark Richard, Propositional Attitudes, pp. 133-196.
Mark Richard, "Defective Contexts, Accommodation, and Normalization ", Canadian J. of Phil. 25 (1995), pp. 551-70.
8. November 5 Soames's theory of attitude ascriptions, Salmon's theory, and their responses to objections
Soames, Beyond Rigidity, chapter 8.
Nathan Salmon, Frege's Puzzle, chapter 8.
Nathan Salmon, "A Millian Heir Rejects the Wages of Sinn," in C. Anthony Anderson and Joseph Owens (eds.), Propositional Attitudes.
Nathan Salmon, "Illogical Belief," Phil. Perspectives 3 (1989), secs. 1-4.
David Braun, "Understanding Belief Reports," Phil. Review (1998).
David Braun, "Cognitive Significance, Attitude Ascriptions, and Ways of Believing."
9. November 12 Kripke on kind terms. Some initial difficulties.
Kripke, Naming and Necessity, lecture 3.
Soames, Beyond Rigidity, chapters 9 and 10.
10. November 19 Salmon and Soames on kind terms.
Soames, Beyond Rigidity, chapter 11.
Nathan Salmon, Reference and Essence, chapter 2.
Mark Johnston, "Manifest Kinds," J. of Phil. (1997), pp. 564-583.
Kathrin Koslicki, "The Semantics of Mass Predicates," Nous 33 (1999), pp. 46-91.
11. November 26 Catch-up and review.
12. December 3 Student presentations
13. December 10 Student presentations