We’ll use as our example of an argument by analogy the argument concerning censorship discussed by Alan Dershowitz in his article “Shouting ‘Fire!’. Copies distributed in class.

 

I. Bare Analogies

One might take a central argument to be something like:

 

1. Shouting “Fire!” in a theater is not protected by the 1st Amendment.
2. Schenck’s distributing leaflets to draftees is similar to shouting “Fire!” in a theater.
3. Schenck’s distributing leaflets to draftees is not protected by the 1st amendment.

 

The pattern here is:

 

1. x is A.
2. y is like x.
3. y is A.

 

This is a puzzling form of argument. Here’s another instance of the pattern:

 

1. Ice hockey is played on ice.
2. Soccer is similar to ice hockey.
3. Soccer is played on ice.

 

This is absurd. Even add “alike in many ways.” Premises like (2) are real trouble. Everything is like everything else in some ways, not in others. Very hard to know what to make of these statements. And so it is very hard to know what to make of the arguments.

The best thing to say is that bare analogical arguments are ill-formed. (Key point.)

 

II. Competing Analogies

Desrhowitz writes some about better analogies. For shouting “Fire”: pulling a fire alarm, etc. For what Schenck did: distributing a leaflet rationally explaining why a building is dangerous. Maybe these are better analogies. So then the argument might go something like this:

 

1. Schenck’s distributing leaflets to draftees is more similar to distributing a leaflet rationally explaining why a building is dangerous than to shouting “Fire!” in a theater.
2. Distributing a leaflet rationally explaining why a building is dangerous is protected by the 1^st Amendment and shouting “Fire” is not.
3. Schenck’s distributing leaflets to draftees is protected by the 1^st Amendment. (1), (2)

 

This is better, but not by much. Arguing about whether one thing is “more like” a second thing than it is like a third is a very confusing matter. You may think that you have a sense of what’s at issue in this case, but in gneral it’s quite unclear just how to think about this. Notice that what Schenk did is not about a building, while the other two things are. The other two are designed to get people out of a building, while what Schenk did is not. You might think that there is some idea about being alike in “relevant ways.” We’ll discuss this next. It’s best to say that competing analogy arguments are also ill-formed. (Second key point.)

 

III. Underlying Principles

None of what’s been said implies that analogies are useless. Rather, we have to see what we can get out of them.

 

The key question to ask yourself is: what exactly is it about shouting “Fire” that made Holmes mention it? It is a “clear and present danger,” he claimed. And he thought that the same was true of Schenk’s actions. According to Holmes, in the context in which the leaflets were distributed, they could cause trouble - resistance to the war effort - and this was a danger. This suggests a general principle, which can be applied to Schenk’s action. The principle is:

 

Any action that presents a clear and present danger is not protected by the 1st Amendment.

 

The point of the analogy was that distributing the leaflet was like shouting “Fire!” in this respect - creating a clear and present danger. It called our attention to this generalization. The argument is:

 

1. Schenck’s distributing the leaflet presents a clear and present danger.
2. Any action that presents a clear and present danger is not protected by the 1st Amendment.
3. Schenck’s distributing the leaflet is not protected by the 1st Amendment. (1), (2)

 

Notice that this reconstruction does not contain the analogy as a premise. Here’s the important general point:

 

What the analogy does is point us in the direction of the relevant generalization. In this case, (2). Usually, when one gives an argument by analogy, there are two things, x and y. Your real interest is x (Schenck, in this case), and the other thing, y (Shouting “Fire” in this case) is said to be analogous. And y obviously has property A (not protected). It is concluded that y has A as well. The key think to look for is the basis for y’s having A. In this case, why is shouting “Fire” not protected? In this case, being a clear and present danger. So the role of the analogy is to help us to identify the relevant generalization. [It need not be a universal generalization, though in this case it is.] Thus, we don’t have to endorse as cogent the form of analogy arguments. Rather, we revise them into arguments fitting familiar patterns.

 

Thus, when we reconstruct analogical arguments in this way, we can avoid answering the hopelessly vague question, “Is the analogy a good one?” or the related question, “Which analogy is better?” Instead, we use analogies to help us identify generalizations to use in reconstructions of the argument. And then we can evaluate the resulting arguments in standard ways: are they well-formed (typically, “yes”)? is generalization reasonable? is the other premise reasonable?

 

We can spell out the process a little more precisely: there is an intended conclusion, which says that some object - the subject - has some property, A. The analogy says that some other object - the analogue - has that property, A. Usually, it is supposed to be very clear that the analogue has A. Moreover, there is some other feature, B, of the analogue that (allegedly) is sufficient for its having that property and which the subject has as well. The connecting generalization of the real argument will relate this second property to property A. In our example A = not protected and B = clear and present danger. The connecting generalization is: All Bs are As.

 

Thus, no good reconstructions will contain simple analogical arguments like the ones described above. Instead, they will be arguments invoking generalizations of the sort just described. (Third key point.)

 

We can evaluate the revised argument in standard ways. Desrshowitz’s critical point, which is a good one, is that (1) is false.

 

Summary:

i) An argument by analogy is a simple argument of the form:

 

x is A.
y is like x.
y is A.

 

ii) The best view about arguments by analogy is that they are ill-formed. Premises of the form “y is like x” are extremely hard to assess, and it is very hard to come to any clear conclusion about whether the premises provide good support for the conclusion.

 

iii) Arguments about which is a “better analogy” are equally obscure.

 

iv) But analogies are not simply to be ignored. They do play a role in sensible thinking about issues. The idea presented here is that analogies help call your attention to arguments in more standard forms.

 

v) Where you have an analogy argument of the form stated above, you should look for some property B, that has (or is thought by the proponent of the argument to have) the following features: a) x has property B; b) it is in virtue of having B that X has A; c) y also has B. In the argument considered in class, B is “being a clear and present danger”. You can now formulate the underlying argument in terms of property B, as we did above. The pattern here is familiar:

 

y is B
All Bs are As
y is A.

 

vi) Notice that the revised argument has the same conclusion as the original one. But the analogy drops out of the argument. Shouting “fire” is not even mentioned. It’s role was to help you identify property B. This same sort of transformation can usually be done when you come across any argument by analogy.

 

More examples:

 

 

Everyone agrees that there should not be government funding for demolition derbies (contests in which people drive old cars around, crashing into one another, until only one car is still able to be driven). But providing government support for the arts - classical music, ballet, fine art - is just like providing government funding for demolition derbies. The main reason we do have funding for the arts is that the wealthy folks who run the government like fancy stuff like the arts and they don’t like lower class stuff like demolition derby. But there’s no real difference: both are leisure time activities that only some people like.

 

Analogical Argument

1    Providing government funding for the arts is like providing government funding for demolition derby.

2.   There should not be government funding for demolition derby.

3.   There should not be government funding for the arts. (1), (2)

 

Revised Argument

1.   All leisure time activities that only some people like should not be supported by gov’t funds. (IP)

2.   The arts are leisure time activities that only some people like. (EP)

3.   The arts should not be supported by gov’t funds. (1), (2)

 

From handout in class: Paley’s argument from design.

 

Analogical Argument

1. Many things in nature are like watches.

2. Watches have intelligent designers.

3. Therefore, many things in nature have intelligent designers.

 

Revised Argument

1. All things whose parts are ordered and arranged in complex ways that enable it to achieve some goal or purpose are the product of an intelligent designer.

2. Many natural things in the universe - e.g., human eyes - are ordered and arranged in complex ways that enable it to achieve some goal or purpose.

3. Therefore, many natural things in the universe - e.g., human eyes - are the product of an intelligent designer.