Philosophy 105
Fall 2005
Lecture Notes - Moral Arguments: Examples

1. Moral Principles: Keep Prayer and Penicillin Separated (p. 370, #7)

Moral arguments sometimes invoke a moral principle, such as principles involving freedom. This example illustrates how this sometimes goes. It may be best to view this column as raising an objection to an argument about freedom of religion. That argument might go something like this:

The Freedom of Religion Argument
1. The state must not favor any religion over any other.
2. If (1), then the state must not punish people for behaving in any of the ways preferred (or required) by their religion.
3. The state must not punish people for behaving in any of the ways preferred (or required) by their religion. (1), (2)
4. In refusing to give their son medical treatment, the Twitchells were behaving in a way preferred by their religion.
5. The state must not punish the Twitchells for refusing to give their son medical treatment. (3), (4)

Goodman objects to (2) in this argument. She seems to say that freedom of religion requires only freedom of belief, not freedom of action. That is, (2) is false. What’s true is something like this:

2a. If (1), then the state must not punish people for any of their religious beliefs.

But from (2a), you can’t generate any argument for (5).

Two general points to notice:

First, often when we argue about something we reply to arguments on the other side rather than formulate arguments in favor of our own side.

Second, one good way to reply to an argument is to claim that a premise is false and to state a related premise that advocates of the argument might have been confusing with the (allegedly) false one. This helps us see why some reasonably sensible person might have been tempted by the argument.

To evaluate Goodman’s criticism of the argument as developed here, you want to consider whether her analysis does justice to advocates of the argument. Goodman may seem to have a sensible position. It is possible that people confuse (2) and (2a). But it is widely held that people have a right to practice their religion. Freedom of religion is not merely a matter of belief, but of action as well. So, advocates of (2) are not simply conflating (2) and (2a). That is, (2a) does not give them all they want.

Perhaps, however, Goodman’s comments lead to a more complicated point. The objection to (2) might be that prohibitions of religious practices in matters of life and death are acceptable. So, the point is that (2) is false but there’s a truth along these lines:

2b. If (1), then the state must not punish people for behaving in any of the ways preferred (or required) by their religion provided that behavior does not cause significant harm to anyone else.

If you insert (2b) into the Freedom of Religion Argument, then you must also revise (4) to:

4a. In refusing to give their son medical treatment, the Twitchell’s were behaving in a way preferred by their religion that did not cause significant harm to anyone else.

But, of course, (4a) is false.

My guess is that in thinking about (2b) it’s best to think about the overall value principle. The question boils down to balancing one good thing - freedom to practice one’s religion - against another - a requirement generally not to harm others, and perhaps specifically in this case not to harm one’s children You can take Goodman to be asserting that the latter outweighs the former. That’s plausible, but she doesn’t say anything to support it. A deeper analysis of the issue would go into that.

General point to note: a good analysis of an article brings out the deeper issues involved. That’s what happened here.

2. Exercise 9 - Vengeance Remains Sole Reason to Support the Death Penalty [Not done in class.]

This letter contains several arguments. There is an argument in the second paragraph from the premise that wrongful executions have occurred in the past to the conclusion that they will continue to occur. The fourth paragraph contains a simple testimonial argument against the deterrent effect of the death penalty. The next paragraph uses a statistical argument to argue for the same conclusion. The next paragraph uses a causal argument based on a correlation to argue that the death penalty leads to more deaths of police officers. There is then a brief argument about discriminatory application of the death penalty. Finally, there is an argument by elimination for why people favor the death penalty.

Most of these arguments are presented briefly and are difficult to evaluate. One comment on the argument by elimination. It seems to go something like this:

1. Either people favor the death penalty because it is a deterrent or because of a wish for vengeance. (IP)
2. It isn’t a deterrent. (EP) [From previous arguments]
3. People favor the death penalty because of a wish for vengeance. (1), (2)

There is a missing quantifier in (1) and (3). Let us assume that “people” could be replaced by “Most advocates of the death penalty.” There remain at least two things wrong with (1). Many people have other reasons having to do with (what they regard as) justice. Furthermore, many people may favor the death penalty because they believe it is a deterrent, not because it actually is a deterrent. Thus, (1) should be replaced by:

1a. Either most advocates of the death penalty favor the death penalty because they believe it is a deterrent or because of a wish for vengeance.

To proceed with an argument by elimination for the same conclusion, one would have to deny the first disjunct of (1a). But no evidence against that disjunct - that most advocates believe the death penalty is a deterrent - is provided.

3. Keeping Track of the Issue: Gun Registration (Exercise 11, p. 375)

This is a response to an editorial that said, roughly, that requiring guns to be registered is comparable to requiring a licence to drive a car.

The first paragraph: the author asserts a conclusion, but notice what it is - that disparaging gun owners is “elitist and out of touch”. What, exactly, does that mean? The next paragraph draws the same conclusion about a universal gun licensing requirement. There’s an argument here. But what’s the conclusion?

C1: Universal gun licensing would not work.

The rest of the paragraph presents some rhetorical questions which obviously support the following premises:

P1. Universal gun licensing would not close the black market for guns.
P2. Universal gun licensing would not prevent gun smuggling from other countries.

You might then use cheap validity to complete the argument. Thus:

P1
P2
P3: If P1 and P2, then C1
C1

This is valid. Notice that the conclusion is not a moral conclusion. It doesn’t say we shouldn’t do something. Just that licensing wouldn’t work.

You could replace (P3) by some principle saying that any gun control policy that does not close the black market and stop gun smuggling doesn’t work. Technicality: You then need to add a premise saying that universal gun licensing is a gun control policy.

Evaluation: Valid. (P1) and (P2) are reasonable. But there’s a question about what the conclusion means. What is it for licensing to “work”? Strong definition: eliminate all illegal guns and gun violence. So understood, the argument is strong! Weaker definition: reduce illegal guns and gun violence. So understood, (P3) is unreasonable. Licensing would very likely keep guns out of the hands of some people in some circumstances. So, the stronger def. makes for the better argument.

But if the author wants to use (C1) as the basis for a further argument to get to the conclusion that we shouldn’t implement the policy of universal gun registration, then he’s in trouble. For he’d then need the seemingly plausible premise:

P4. If a gun control policy will not work, we should not implement it.

But given the standards being used to define what it is for a policy to work, (P4) is false. We ought to do things that don’t “work” in this sense. If we return to a more sensible meaning for what it is for a policy to work, then (P3) is false. The policy could work - by reducing gun violence - without closing the black market and stopping smuggling.

General point illustrated by this example: people often argue against some proposal on the grounds that it doesn’t completely resolve the problem it is designed to deal with. But that’s usually asking for too much. Analogy: suppose I’m trying to design a course syllabus and set requirements for the course. I know that whatever I pick, something else would have been better for some students. This points you toward thinking about the overall value of a proposal, not it’s being ideal.

 [To be continued...]