Office: Lattimore 534
Phone: (716) 275-4387
(Under the direction of Prof. David Braun)
Mental causation is seen as a problem for the nonreductive physicalist
because physicalism seems to have epiphenomenal implications for the mental
-- any consistent non-reductive physicalist theory of the mind appears to
make the mental aspects of our lives causally inert. The general
difficulty may be characterized as follows: we know that causes have their
effects in virtue of their properties; so either mental properties are
responsible for their effects or they are not; if they are responsible, and
the effects are not overdetermined, then the causal closure of the physical
seems to be violated; but if they are not responsible, then it appears that
mental properties are epiphenomenal. But this does not accord with our
intuitions -- we really do perform particular actions because we have
certain beliefs and desires; if our beliefs had been different, our actions
may have been different.
So, we face a dilemma, for our scientific convictions about the world tell us that the physical domain is causally closed -- roughly, the physical world is causally autonomous. But our commonsense view of our mental lives conflicts with this scientific worldview -- the two seem incompatible. The problem of mental causation, for a contemporary physicalist, is to produce a solution to this dilemma, by rejecting one or the other horn, and thereby by giving up on one resolutely held conviction or other (or so it might appear). Alternatively, one may try to resolve the difficulty by finding a way to reconcile the two horns. Negotiating a path between the two has proven to be the preferred solution to the problem, but, I shall argue, an entirely satisfactory path has yet to be navigated. I shall propose a relatively novel theory which I believe successfully takes such a path (it may be novel, but is not trailblazing, by any stretch), while, of course, pointing out the shortcomings of rival theories along the way.
 Questions? Comments? E-mail me |
 Back to my UR mini page (nice photo, eh? Photography by Ted Sider) |
 Back to Philosophy at U of R |
Last updated August 24, 1999 by Greg
Janssen
Thanks to Bill "Crash"
Piervincenzi